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Administrative Law-Continental Can Co., Inc. v. State of
Minnesota: A Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment by
Coworkers
Sexual harassment' in employment, outlawed by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,2 became a prominent social and legal issue in the latter
half of the 1970s. 3 Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Continental Can Co., Inc., v. State,4 however, Title VII was interpreted only to
prohibit a male supervisor from demanding sexual favors from a female em-
ployee and conditioning the employee's employment status on her acceptance
or rejection of his demands.5 Continental Can upheld for the first time a cause
of action against an employer for sexual harassment by co-employees, even
though the harassment was not in the form of sexual demand6 and although
the employee's status of employment was not conditioned on her acceptance of
any demands7. The plaintiff stated a claim under the antidiscrimination pro-
visions of the Minnesota Human Rights Act,8 which are substantially similar
to the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII.9 Because the Minnesota
court looked to principles developed under Title VII to interpret the Human
Rights Act, 10 the decision may be a harbinger of the cause of action for sexual
harassment and removal of impediments to action under Title VII."
In Continental Can a female employee of Continental Can Company,
Willie Ruth Hawkins was subjected to repeated verbal and physical harass-
ment by several male coworkers.12 This harassment consisted of "explicit sex-
1. "Sexual harassment" as used in this Note encompasses verbal and physical conduct that
is sexually motivated and is directed towards non-soliciting employees. The definition includes
sexual advances, comments, and physical contact of a sexual nature. Sexual harassment is distin-
guished from "harassment because of sex", which is not motivated by sexual feelings but is di-
rected toward a person solely because of his or her gender. See text accompanying notes 70 to 74,
infra.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to -17 (1976).
The heart of Title VII is § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which provides: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer--() to ... discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
3. The initial case validating this cause of action was Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976), aldsub nom Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For a discussion of
the historical development of this cause of action, see text accompanying notes 28 to 44 infra.
4. - Minn. -, 297 N.W.2d 241 (1980).
5. See text accompanying notes 34 to 44 infra.
6. - Minn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 249.
7. See text accompanying notes 12 to 22 and 34 to 44 infra.
8. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01 to .13 (1966 & Supp. 1980). MINN. STAT. § 363.03-1(2)(c)
(Supp. 1980) provides that it is an unfair employment practice "for an employer, because of...
sex, to discriminate against a person with respect to his... compensation, terms... [or] condi-
tions.., of employment."
9. Compare note 2, supra, with note 8, supra.
10. "Principles developed in Title VII cases are instructive and have been applied by this
Court when construing the Minnesota Act." - Minn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 246.
11. See text accompanying notes 34 to 44 and 45 to 83 infra.
12. There were only two female employees in the entire plant, and both of them were
harassed by male co-employees. Both complained of the verbal abuse, but only Hawkins was
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ually derogatory remarks and verbal sexual advances," and one male
employee "frequently patted [Hawkins] on the posterior."' 13 Hawkins made
her objections to this behavior known to both the harassing males and her
supervisor. Hawkins refused to identify the harassers to her supervisor, and
Continental took no action. 14 Rather, the supervisor responded that "there
was nothing he could do and she had to expect that kind of behavior when
working with men."15
Because of this lack of response, Hawkins felt she had to endure the abuse
and made no further complaints until prompted by harassment six months
later. While Hawkins was bending over at a machine, a male co-worker "ap-
proached her from behind and grabbed her between the legs."'16 She com-
plained immediately to the plant manager, but no action was taken at that
time. '7 Although the incident was formally investigated more than two weeks
later, the investigation was not prompted by the harassment' 8 but by other
incidents of racial and personal violence at the plant 19 and ensuing pressure
from community interest groups.20 Hawkins refused to return to work after
this incident until her safety was guaranteed.2' No assurance was given by
Continental, and Hawkins' employment was subsequently terminated.
22
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that Continental had committed
two employment violations of the Human Rights Act,23 thereby constructively
discharging Hawkins.24 The first violation of the Act occurred when Conti-
nental took no action after Hawkins' initial complaint.25 The second violation
was caused by Continental's failure to take timely action after Hawkins' sec-
actually physically abused. Hawkins was the only female discharged and thus the only one bring-
ing suit. - Minn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 244-45.
13. Id. at-, 297 N.W.2d at 244.
14. Id.
15. Id. at -- 297 N.W.2d at 246.
16. Id. at-, 297 N.W.2d at 244.
17. Id.
18. Id. at - 297 N.W.2d at 244-45.
19. There are some unexplained incidents attributed to racial tensions that occurred after the
sexual harassment but before Hawkins left her job. Hawkins' car headlights were intentionally
smashed in the company parking lot. Also, a male employee of Continental assaulted Hawkins in
her home by threatening her with a gun in front of her children. This action was taken after
Hawkins allegedly made a threatening call to the male employee's wife. Id.
20. Id. Hawkins and her husband and officials of Continental met after the violence to dis-
cuss these problems, but Hawkins refused to return to work. The Urban League and a community
relations group met with Continental and threatened a boycott apparently because of the racial




23. Id. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 250-51. Continental was found to have violated MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.03-1(2)(c) (1966 & Supp. 1980). See note 8 supra.
24. - Mlnn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 251. A constructive discharge occurs when an employer
makes the employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is justified in resiging.
Here the employee resigned to escape intolerable working conditions caused by illegal discrimina-
tion. Constructive discharge has been accepted in Title VII cases. See Young v. Southwestern
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975).
25. - Minn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 250. Since the harassment was directed at Hawkins be-
cause of her gender, she was subjected to different conditions of employment because of her gen-
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ond complaint.26 Through its inaction Continental had conditioned Hawkins'
employment on her adjustment to an intimidating work environment not suf-
fered by male employees. Since Continental knew or should have known of
these alleged acts of sexual harassment by coworkers and did not take timely
and appropriate action, it discriminated against Hawkins by subjecting her to
different working conditions in violation of the Human Rights Act.
27
This was a case of first impression under the Human Rights Act, and the
Minnesota court also found no Title VII cases on point.28 Indeed, the cause of
action under Title VII against an employer for a supervisor's rather than a co-
worker's harassment is of recent origin, and in the initial cases brought under
this theory the district courts rejected employer liability on several grounds.29
Some courts found that supervisory harassment did not constitute gender
based discrimination because the discrimination was based on refusal to en-
gage in sexual relations rather than on gender.30 Other courts viewed this type
of conduct with a boys-will-be-boys attitude and held it would be unfair to
hold the employer liable for the "personal proclivities" of a supervisor.
31
While courts gave other reasons for rejecting the cause of action,32 the moti-
der. Continental had a duty to correct this gender-based difference in conditions of employment
once it had knowledge of it.
26. Continental did take action after the second complaint, including the suspension of two
employees, but no formal investigation was conducted nor any affirmative action taken for three
weeks. This action consisted of disseminating the company's anti-harassment policy to employees,
and was motivated by a threatened boycott. Since the action was not timely, the Act was violated
a second time. Id. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 250-51.
27. Id. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 251.
28. See id. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 246-48.
29. The victim of harassment was not totally without a legal remedy. The victim has re-
course to the common law tort remedies, including battery, assault, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. For an excellent discussion of these remedies, see 64 MINN. L. REv. 151, 167-
177 (1979). For mental anguish in North Carolina, see Byrd, Recovery for Mental Anguish in
North Carolina, 58 N.C. L. REv. 435 (1980). The problem with these remedies is that the victim
may have to recover from the harasser, who may be judgment proof. The victim may sue the
employer of the harasser on a respondeat superior theory, but this imputation of liability will not
be recognized unless the conduct is in the scope of employment. This is especially true of inten-
tional torts. See W. PRossCR, LAW OF TORTS 464-467 (4th ed. 1971).
A victim may also be able to recover on a breach of contract theory. See Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), in which plaintiff alleged that rejection of her
supervisor's advances led to her dismissal and the court awarded her back pay for breach of
contract.
For a comparison of the procedural aspects of Title VII vis-a-vis common law remedies for
harassment, see Seymour, Sexual Harassment: Finding a Cause ofAction Under Title VII, 30 LAB.
L. J. 139 (1979).
30. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D. N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d
1044 (3rd Cir. 1977). The lower court found no sex discrimination since Title VII was not in-
tended to remedy a "physical attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and
which happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley." 422 F. Supp. at 556.
The upper court disagreed.
31. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz, 1975), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
32. E.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979) (lower court found no discrimination because the harassment was not company
policy and plaintiff had not exhausted the in-house grievance procedure; Barnes v. Train 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub non. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (no inherent gender based discrimination, since a bisexual supervisor who made advances to
both men and women would not be committing unlawful discrimination).
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vating force behind its rejection apparently was a perception of sexual harass-
ment as a personal relation between a man and a woman that did not affect
the conditions of employment. Some courts were also concerned about a flood
of litigation that might be brought by disgruntled female employees.
33
The seminal case recognizing sexual harassment by a supervisor as gen-
der-based discrimination for which an employer 34 could be liable was Wil-
liams Y. Saxbe.35 Since Saxbe the initial district court cases that rejected
supervisor harassment as a cause of action have all been overruled or discred-
ited,3 6 and four circuit courts have acknowledged this cause of action.37 The
circuits have not agreed, however, on the necessary elements of the cause of
action and have construed it more narrowly than the cause of action for other
types of harassment proscribed by Title VII.
38
One area of disagreement among the circuits is the correct theory of em-
ployer liability. In the earlier cases courts held that the plaintiff must allege
and prove the employer had a policy of condoning sexual harassment,39 and a
recent case was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to allege this.40 Other
courts have found liability when the plaintiff alleged and proved that the em-
ployer had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and allowed it
to continue.41 A recent circuit court decision has eliminated the necessity of
proving an employer policy or employer knowledge of the supervisor's act and
has enunciated a standard of strict employer liability for the acts of a supervi-
sor if that supervisor has the power to make employment related decisions and
if the harassment was in fact related to the making of an employment related
decision.42
Another area of disagreement is the extent to which the harassment must
33. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F Supp. 553 (D. N.J. 1976).
34. For theories of supervisor or coworker liability, see note 29 supra and materials cited
'therein.
35. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
36. See notes 29 to 33 supra.
37. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Garber v. Saxon Business Prod-
ucts, Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 56C F.2d 1044
(3rd Cir. 1977); Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also cases collected atAnnot.,
46 A.L.R. Fed. 224 (1980).
38. See text accompanying notes 39 to 49 & 77, infra. This cause of action is more narrowly
construed than other Title VII actions by requiring the fulfillment of different and more rigorous
elements to state a prima facie case. Perhaps the reason for this more rigorous treatment of sexual
harassment is that courts are dealing with conduct based on sexual role stereotyping. This type of
conduct has traditionally been accepted, at least implicitly.
39. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660, n. 8 (D.D.C. 1976), aft'din relevant
part sub non Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (employee must allege and prove
employer's policy). Contra, Heelan v. Johns-Manville, 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D.C. Colo. 1978) (un-
necessary to allege or prove such a policy).
40. Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (must allege
employer approved of the supervisor's actions or that the conduct reflected an employer policy).
41. See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977) (allegation
that employer allowed supervisor to harass); Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prod., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th
Cir. 1977) (allegation of employer knowledge or acquiescence).
42. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This approach makes the employer strictly liable on an agency type
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affect the conditions of employment. To be actionable under Title VII, harass-
ment must affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the
victim. 43 Although the necessary degree of effect is disputed, all the cases have
held that there must be a nexus between the harassment and the victim's em-
ployment status.44 The decision of the employee to accept of reject the harass-
ment must affect her position in employment-she must accept to avoid
getting fired or to gain a promotion or to avoid a transfer or demotion. This
requirement has limited actionable harassment to actual demands by supervi-
sors for sexual favors.
Thus far no court has found that the creation of a hostile work environ-
ment by sexual harassment affects the conditions of employment in violation
of Title VII.45 This has precluded the possibility of a cause of action for har-
assment by co-employees because fellow workers presumably lack the power
to change the victim's employment status. For example, in Pantchenco v. CB.
theory. This has the advantage to the plaintiff of not having to prove consent of one's employer or
constructive knowledge.
While the court in Continental Can declined to discuss this issue, the EEOC Guidelines im-
pose strict liability on an employer for all sexually-motivated conduct of a supervisory employee.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1980) (reprinted at note 50 infra). The imposition of strict liability
expands the cause of action for harassment by eliminating the necessity of two judicially created
elements-employer notice and proof of an employer policy condoning harassment. See text ac-
companying notes 38 to 44 supra. Very few if any employers have such a policy, and proving the
existence of such a policy is almost impossible. The supervisor acts for the employer in carrying
out the policies and practices of the employer, and thus his actions are the actions of the employer.
The employer has a greater opportunity to control and direct the supervisor than it does other
employees, and the imputation of a higher degree of responsibility is consistent with this relation-
ship. The imposition of strict liability in this situation will prevent employers from claiming they
had no knowledge of the harassment and from shifting liability to a judgment proof supervisor.
See note 29 supra. It also removes the "one free shot" opportunity in which the supervisor doing
the harassing is the only available conduit of notice to the employer. In Vinson v. Taylor, 22
Empl. Prac. Dec. 14,687 (D.D.C. 1980), the plaintiff was harassed and forced into sexual favors by
her supervisor in order to maintain her status of employment. The supervisor was the manager of
the facility where the plaintiff worked, and plaintiff had no mechanism to report this harassment
to higher members of the corporation. The court denied the claim because of lack of employer
notice: "It seems reasonable that an employer should not be liable in these unusual cases where
notice to the employer must depend upon the actual perpetrator and when there is nothing else to
place the employer on notice." Id. at 14,691. This in effect leaves a plaintiff who has been
wronged without a viable remedy.
Employers of course oppose strict liability and complain tht they will have to police the per-
sonal interactions of supervisors and employees. See note 50 infra. However, any kind of harass-
ment based on the personal proclivities or prejudices of a supervisor necessarily involves
interpersonal interaction. EEOC and court decisions have for some time imposed strict liability
under Title VII for supervisory harassment based on race, religion, and national origin, as well as
nonharassment areas of discrimintion. See Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522
(W.D. Pa. 1973), modjYed 541 F.2d 394 (3rd Cir. 1976) (discrimination because of sex); Tidwell v.
American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971) (racial harassment); Flowers v. Crouch-
Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (racial harassment); Anderson v. Methodist Evangeli-
cal Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972) (racial harassment); Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 353 F.
Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (national origin); Compston v. Borden, 424 F. Sup. 157 (S.D. Ohio
1976) (religious harassment). The imposition of strict liability in this situation is an attempt to
achieve consistency among the different types of discrimination suits under Title VII.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
44. All the cases cited in notes 26 to 36 supra have stated this either implicitly or explicitly,
but the cases on this subject have almost all dealt with a situation where a nexus existed.
45. This argument was made in Tomidins, upra notes 26 and 35, but was not considered by
the upper court. The court found that sexual demands of a supervisor created a sex-based condi-
tion of employment.
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Dolge Co. ,46 a female employee alleged that a male co-employee had harassed
her physically and requested sexual favors. The court found no discrimination
in the terms and conditions of her employment because the male employee
could not affect her status in retaliation for her refusal of his request.47 Simi-
larly, in Smith v. Rust Engineering Co. ,48 a female engineer was subjected to
sexual remarks and advances by a male coworker. The court stated that a
Title VII claim required her to allege and prove that accession to these ad-
vances was an express or implied requirement for maintaining her employ-
ment status. The male employee could not affect her status, so this was
considered a personal matter not covered by Title VII.49
Recently, the EEOC promulgated an amendment 5o to its Guidelines on
46. 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 686 (D. Conn. 1977), afl'din relevantpart, 18 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (2d Cir. 1978).
47. The lower court stated there was a lack of evidence of this harassment, but that the claim
"would not in any event constitute a Title VII violation" because it could not meet the nexus
requirement of Tomkins. Id at 689.
48. 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4783, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1172 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
49. Id. The court stated that Title VII was not for lersonal problems, but to remedy employ-
ment discrimination. This discrimination could only exist if the advances and remarks were tied
to a change in working conditions, and that change had to be in the status of the employee.
50. Published in 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024, April 11, 1980, amended in 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, pub-
lished as the finalized Guideline in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (effective November 10, 1980). The
amended Guideline reads as follows:
Sec. 1604.11 Sexual Harassment
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.I Unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (I) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
I The principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or national
origin.
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Com-
mission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as
the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents oc-
curred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the
facts, on a case by case basis.
(c) Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment agency, joint
apprenticeship committee or labor organization (hereinafter collectively referred to as"employer") is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees
with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of
were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the em-
ployer knew or should have known of their occurrence. The Commission will examine
the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job functions per-
formed by the individual in determining whether an individual acts in either a supervi-
sory or agency capacity.
(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible
for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct unless it can show
that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
(e) An employer may also be responsible for the acts of nonemployees, with respect
to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission
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Discrimination Because of Sex51 stating the Commission's position on sexual
harassment as a cause of action under Title VII. The Guidelines are interpre-
tive only, and their exact effect cannot yet be determined. 2 The amendment
broadly defines sexual harassment to include almost any verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature. The cause of action has been expanded to cover
situations where submission to the harassment is made an implicit or explicit
term or condition of employment, is used as a basis for employment decisions,
or substantially interferes with an employee's performance or creates a hostile
work environment.5 3 The amendment thus eliminates the strict nexus require-
ment and adopts an "atmosphere" test that makes both supervisor and co-
employee harassment actionable. Under the new Guidelines the employer is
strictly liable for harassment by supervisors and agents, regardless of notice or
company policy; liability for acts of other employees hinges on the employer's
actual or constructive knowledge and subsequent remedial efforts. The
Guidelines call for liability for some acts of nonemployees and also speak to
the issue of liability for "reverse" harassment.
54
The expanded cause of action advocated by the new Guidelines is a logi-
cal extension of interpretations of Title VII in other areas. The EEOC has
will consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility
which the employer may have with, respect to the conduct of such non-employees.
(f) Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An em-
ployer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such
as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropri-
ate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
(g) Other related practices: Where employment opportunities or benefits are
granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or re-
quests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimiantion
against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or
benefit. [Sec. 1604.11 reads as last amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 74676, effective November
10, 1980].
These are Guidelines on which public comment was accepted. Employers were strongly op-
posed to the amendment. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce cited the burdensome responsibility of
employers policing the personal lives of supervisors, and stated that it is better to deal with these
things voluntarily. All the employer comments expressed dislike of strict liability for supervisors,
calling it "patently irresponsible." It was also commented that the concept of when an employer
"should have known" is too vague for application and will lead to a multitude of groundless suits.
Women's groups and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights supported the amendment, but
requested more guidance as to what is actually sexual harassment. Some also favored strict liabil-
ity for coworker harassment. See 104 LRR 148, June 23, 1980.
51. The EEOC has twice before promulgated Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex.
The initial Guidelines were published in 1965, but were superseded by the 1972 Guidelines pub-
lished in 37 Fed. Reg. 6836, April 5, 1972. The new section 1604.11, is the first pronouncement on
harassment.
52. The EEOC has power to make regulations dealing only with procedural issues. This
power is granted in § 713(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a). The guidelines do not have the
weight of regulations or of law, but they are entitled to "great deference" according to the
Supreme Court of the United States. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
However, the courts have not always followed the Guidelines, and the U.S. Supreme Court itself
has not always abided by them. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(l)-(3); see note 50 supra.
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e), (g). For a discussion of employer liability for harassment by
nonemployees, see note 87 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of "reverse" discrimina-
tion, see text accompanying note 87-88 infra.
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consistently held in racial harassment cases that an employer has a duty to
maintain a work environment free of discriminatory intimidation.55 Several
courts have also recognized that employment discrimination can be premised
on the character of the work environment.5 6 This sentiment was eloquently
expressed in Rogers v. E.E. 0. C ,57 in which the court stated that the Title VII
proscription of discrimination in the "terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment . . . sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
working environment heavily charged with discrimination."58 Application of
this atmosphere test in racial harassment cases indicates that Title VII protects
an economic and a psychological interest in one's job,59 both of which are
threatened by harassment. If the employee has a right of equal access to em-
ployment opportunities, this right encompasses the right of that employee to
pursue the opportunity in a non-discriminatory environment.
The court in Continental Can, influenced by the Guidelines and Title VII
racial harassment cases, rejected the strict nexus requirement previously ap-
plied by federal courts under Title VII and adopted the hostile atmosphere
concept.60 The court stated that one purpose of the Human Rights Act is to
protect females in the workplace from disparate treatment based on their gen-
55. E.g., [1973] EEOC Dec. 4637, 4639 (1972) ('Title VII requires an employer to maintain a
working environment free of racial and ethnic intimidation and insult.") See also [1973] EEOC
Dec. 4056 (1969); EEOC Dec. 4302 (1970); 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 317 (1971); 4 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 852 (1972).
56. See Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1978) (affirming a finding that
all workers had the right to work in an environment free from racial discrimination, and finding
that the plaintiff stated a prima facie case under Title VII by alleging racial harassment by a
supervisor). See also cases at note 58, infra.
57. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). In Rogers, defendants had
allotted customers of Hispanic origin to workers of Hispanic origin; a similar arrangement was
made for Anglo customers and workers. This segregation undermined the morale of employees in
a manner that deprived them of employment opportunities and was thus deemed to be illegal
discrimination.
58. Id. at 238. Although this announcement may have been dictum infAogers, several subse-
quent cases applied this concept. See, e.g., EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 22 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 15,607 (1979); DeGrace v. Rumsfield, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. §30,621 (1979); Gray v.
Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United Transportation Local 974 v. Nor-
folk & W. R.R., 532 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1975). But see Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp.
55 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 33
(W.D. Ky. 1971), aft'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
59. The economic interest of an employee is threatened by harassment when the employee is
constructively discharged, or when the employee would be better off econoically but for the liar-
assment or the employee's reaction to the harassment. An employee's psychological interest in his
or her employment relates to the quality of the work environment. The atmosphere concept gives
the employee the right to work in an environment free from discrimination or harassment. The
employee may be subjected to such psychological or emotional stress that he or she is forced into a
constructive discharge. For a discussion of constructive discharge, see note 23, supra.
60. - Minn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 249:
We hold that the prohibition against sex discrimination in Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd.
l(2)(c) (1978) includes sexual harassment which impacts on the conditions of employ-
ment when the employer knew or should have known of the employees' conduct alleged
to constitute sexual harassment and fails to take timely and appropriate action (footnote
omitted). To determine whether actionable sex discrimination exists in a given case, all
the circumstances surrounding the conduct alleged to constitue sexual harassment, such
as the nature of the incidents and the context in which they occurred, should be ex-
amined. In addition, the facts alleged to constitute notice to the employer of the em-
ployee's conduct as well as the circumstances surrounding those facts should be
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der. Although this type of disparate treatment is more easily seen and perhaps
more opprobrious when a supervisor conditions an employee's status on her
accession to sexual demands, female employees also suffer disparate treatment
when their employment is conditioned on adapting to a work environment
replete with sexually motivated remarks and conduct. When this conduct is
directed solely at females because they are female, they experience a working
environment different from that of male employees. While the status of the
female is not affected, her employment is conditioned on working in an envi-
ronment polluted by harassment aimed only at women.61 Finally, the work
atmosphere is as easily affected by coworkers as by supervisors.62
The court held Continental liable because it failed to take timely and ap-
propriate action after it knew or should have known of the harassment by the
co-employees. 63 In refusing to impose strict liability on Continental Can for
the co-employees' conduct, the court relied on the nature of the relationship
between employer and employee, and between employees, in an industrial set-
ting. It is impossible for an employer to control all the actions of employees,"
but the court stated that an employer must do its best to achieve a work envi-
ronment as comfortable for females as for males. To meet his duty, the em-
ployer must take immediate and appropriate action whenever it has
knowledge of sexual harassment. The court held the employer to the reason-
able man standard, and closed a potential loophole by holding that the em-
ployer's knowledge of the harassment could be actual or constructive.
65
The court found Continental to have violated the provision of the statute
prohibiting "an employer, because of. . .sex. . . to discriminate against an
employee with respect to his . . . terms . . . [or] conditions . . . of employ-
ment." 66 In finding a violation of the Act, the court necessarily found that
Continental discriminated against Hawkins. The court did not, however, dis-
cuss the issue of whether intent was a necessary element of a finding of dis-
crimination. Under Title VII, there are two basic theories of discrimination:
disparate impact,67 which requires no intent for an ultimate finding of discrim-
considered. Finally, the timeliness and appropriateness of the employer's response, if
any, to the conduct complained of should be examined.
61. Id. at - 297 N.W.2d at 248.
62. Id.
63. Id. at - 297 N.W.2d at 250. The court declined to decide the standard of liability for
supervisor conduct.
64. Id. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 249.
65. Id. Actual knowledge by the employer requires the complainant to notify someone who
represents the employer, i.e., a supervisor, about the conduct. There is no help offered in the
Guidelines or in Continental Can as to when the employer "should know" of the harassment. The
standard appears to be the "reasonable man" standard used in negligence cases, which is a factual
standard to be determined by looking at all the circumstances.
This type of constructive knowledge may be found if an employer fails to set up an effective
rievance procedure. If an employee is stymied in her attempt to give notice or file a complaint of
hrassment by lack of a viable grievance procedure, the employer may be held to have construc-
tive knowledge of the harassment.
66. MrNN. STAT. ANNOT. § 363.03-1(2)(c) (West 1966). Compare id with § 703A of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
67. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs was the seminal case in
enunciating the disparate impact theory of employment. This theory is usually applied to situa-
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ination, and disparate treatment, 68 which does require an ultimate finding of
intent to discriminate. The acts in Continental Can fall under the disparate
treatment theory, because they constitute an employment practice that is not
facially neutral; thus, defendant's discriminatory intent must be proved.
Although the court did not discuss the requisite intent for discrimination
under the Act, proving this intent under Title VII does not seem difficult. If an
employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment, he or she
would perforce know that the victim was being subjected to differing condi-
tions of employment. By failing to correct this condition after having knowl-
edge of it, the employer's intent is to let the discriminatory condition remain
and thus to subject the employee to discriminatory terms or conditions of em-
ployment.
69
The expansion of "conditions of employment" to include the work envi-
ronment is a logical step in eradicating harassment. This concept of atmos-
phere as a condition of employment had already been applied to Title VII
cases of discrimination by harassment because of sex but which lack any sex-
ual connotations.70 For example, in Macey v. WorldAirways71 the first female
electrician ever hired by the airline met resistance from the male employees.
The male employees resented her intrusion and responded with disparaging
remarks and a refusal to help her learn the job. The court held this type of
harassment violative of Title VII because it imposed disparate working condi-
tions on the female.72 In a similar fact situation, the EEOC stated that "Title
VII requires an employer to maintain a working environment free of sex-
based discrimination." 73 Sexual harassment, like harassment of a female in-
tions where a facially neutral employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected group.
Although there is no overt discriminatory intent by the employer, he is liable for the discrimina-
tion that is the result of his practices. In justifying this theory, the court stated "Congress directed
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id.
at 432.
68. Disparate treatment refers to the traditional concept of discrimination involving different
treatment for different persons, groups, races, etc. This type of discrimination is not unlawful
unless declared so by statute; it also requires that the defendant have an actual intent to discrimi-
nate, i.e., an intent to treat one person or group differently from another. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
69. Intent is often very difficult to prove by direct evidence, but it can be inferred from the
conduct and other circumstances, surrounding an act. See Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical
Hospital, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 33 (W.D. Ky. 1971) ajj'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
Once a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case under the McDonnellDouglas approach, an infer-
ence of discrimination is raised "because we presume these acts if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). The prima facie case operates to eliminate all the
legitimate reasons for differential treatment and puts the burden on the defendant to rebut the
inference.
70. See definition at note 1, supra.
71. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
72. Id. at 1428. The male employees resented Macey's presence in the formerly all male
workplace and, in an effort to impede her progress, refused to help her. One male employee
refused to help her because she was a "woman being paid as much as the men." Her complaints
were met with the response of "that's what you have to expect when you work with men." Macey
was discharged, allegedly for absenteeism, but the court found that the discharge was in retalia-
tion for filing a complaint with the EEOC concerning the harassment. Id. at 1428-30.
73. [1973] EEOC Dec. 4511, 4512 (1971). A female employee was demoted three days after
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truder in a "male" job,74 is harassment based on gender. To require a nexus
between harassment and status in the former situation and not the latter
makes an employer's liability dependent upon the content of the harassment.
This is contrary to the purpose of the Human Rights Act and Title VII, both of
which seek to eliminate disparate treatment based on certain features of the
victim. This purpose is best achieved by examining the feature causing the
discrimination (the victim's gender) and the effect of the discrimination (dispa-
rate treatment) rather than focusing on the content of the harassment.
75
The nexus test does, however, have several advantages over the "polluted
atmosphere" test. To be actionable under Title VII or the Human Rights Act,
harassment must have some employment consequence.7 6 These consequences
are more easily seen, and the proof more quantifiable, when the harassment
takes the form of a supervisor conditioning status on accession to demands.
Employment consequences flowing from a change in the working atmosphere
are harder to measure.77 Also, the nexus requirement limits lawsuits to cases
of harassment by persons in positions of power, whereas the adoption of the
atmosphere test will probably generate more harassment suits. However, diffi-
culties of proof and overcrowded dockets are insufficient reasons to deny relief
if an injury has occurred.
The Guidelines recognize the difficulty of determining when harassment
has sufficient employment consequence to be actionable and adopt a case-by-
case method of looking at the "totality of the circumstances." 7 8 This approach
is of little use when dealing with a concept as vague as "atmosphere." The
case law dealing with this is minimal, but some guidance can be gleaned from
cases of racial harassment and sexual advances. These cases indicate that the
assignment to a job formerly performed only by males. The EEOC found that her inability to
perform the tasks was due to male employees' harassment and failure to help her learn, which
amounted to unlawful sex discrimination. Id. at 4511.
74. See text accompanying notes 70 to 73, supra.
75. None of the courts dealing with instances of racial harassment have required this connec-
tion between status and harassment for the harassment to be actionable. Furthermore, there is no
such requirement contained in either the Human Rights Act or Title VII. This expansion of con-
ditions of employment to include the work environment addresses much of the harassment in the
workplace. Most harassment, verbal and physical, undoubtedly does not reach the level of sexual
demands. Although a coworker has no power to affect a victim's status, and thus no power to
enforce sexual demands, a coworker can harass in other ways. If the harassment affects the vic-
tim's performance or work environment, it should be actionable. To require the nexus between
status and harassment denies recovery for discrimination in many situations.
76. The harassment must cause discrimination in the terms, conditions, or compensation of
employment. See notes 2 & 8, and text accompanying notes 43 & 44, supra.
77. Courts have discussed this issue in two cases dealing with the atmosphere concept. In
Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), the court stated that a hostile working environ-
ment was discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment. However, the plaintiff would
have to prove an environment "so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely
the emotional and psychological stability' of the harassed workers. Id. at 238. This is a standard
so high that it hardly could be met by harassment of any nature.
The court in Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977) denied a cause of
action for a discriminatory atmosphere because it is almost impossible to prove: "Such a nebulous
concept-that of 'atmosphere'--is not susceptible to any accepted method of proof in a court of
law." Id. at 74.
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1980).
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conduct must be sexually (or racially) motivated, and must reach the level of
unwelcome harassment.79 A single instance, or sporadic or inadvertent con-
duct, should be insufficient to pollute the work environment.80 Also, the
plaintiff must be adversely affected by the harassment and not take it as a joke
or mere inconvenience prior to the lawsuit.
8 '
The court in Continental Can held that employer liability was conditioned
on having actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment.82 In adopting
a standard of liability based on an employer's actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the harassment the court turned to cases on racial and national origin
harassment8 3 and the EEOC Guidelines,84 both of which employ this stan-
dard. If an employer's liability is extended to co-employee harassment, then
this standard of liability, rather than the strict liability standard used in cases
of supervisor harassment, is fair to the employer. An employer cannot control
directly every whim or defect of character of its employees, and strict liability
would impose an impossible duty on the employer. Conversely, an employer
cannot totally disclaim the acts of its employees committed in the workplace,
Once apprised of discriminatory conduct, the employer's duty to remedy the
situation immediately is not burdensome and comports with sound personnel
management.
Although employers and the EEOC differ on remedies and bases of liabil-
ity,8 5 the Guidelines and the decision in Continental Can signal a growing
awareness of sexual harassment and an attempt to remedy the problem.8 6 The
case and the Guidelines expose the employer to large potential liability. The
exact scope of employer liability is still clouded by some unanswered issues.
79. See Smith v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 724 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(proof that plaintiffis foreman had made a pass at her did not reach the level of harassment);
Caridis v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (casual ethnic slurs
insufficient to constitute national origin discrimination).
80. Winfrey v. Metropolitan Utils. Dist., 467 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D. Neb. 1979) (single incident
of racial slur insufficient to constitute discrimination); Crocker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138,
1191 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (same). See Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 382-83 (E.D. Va. 1977)
a§'d, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978) (racial slurs and comments do not reach level of harassment);
Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (court discusses level of
national origin harassment needed to be actionable).
81. See Bundy v. Jackson, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1979) (harassment fully
proved, but plaintiff did not take it seriously and there was no effect on conditions of employ-
ment).
82. - Minn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 249 (1980).
83. See Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Va. 1977) a 'd 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.
1978) (racial harassment); Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (same);
Crocker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (same); Howard v. National Cash
Register, 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (same); Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (national origin harassment).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1980).
85. See note 50 smpra.
86. One state has recently passed a discrimination-in-employment statute that incorporates
almost verbatim the EEOC Guidelines. See Connecticut's Human Rights and Opportunities Act,
CON. GEN. STAT. ch. 814c, § 46a-60(8) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Almost all states have these anti-
discrimination statutes, although some are so vague, see N.C. GEN. STAT. ART. 49, §§ 143-416.1 to
.3 (1977), and some are so inclusive of the discrimination they outlaw, see COLO. REV. STAT. tit.
24, art. 34, that it will be difficult to successfully advance a cause of action for harassment creating
an intimidating workplace.
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The biggest unknown is what will be considered sexual harassment. The dis-
play of pornographic pictures and telling of "dirty jokes" would seem to pol-
lute the atmosphere, as would lewd gestures. The use of sexual terms in banter
among co-workers, or even in private conversations that the "victim" necessar-
ily overhears because of the nature of the workplace, may also rise to the level
of harassment although there are potential first amendment problems in this
application. A more difficult question is whether the wearing of provocative
clothing could constitute sexual harassment. For example, the wearing of
some revealing or sexy clothing may be "unwelcome. . .physical conduct of
a sexual nature" that interferes with an employee's work or creates an offen-
sive working environment.8 7 Future courts will have to take into account the
frailties and sensitivities of individual employees when deciding if the above
situations and others that arise are employment consequences fairly chargea-
ble to the employer.
Another cloudy aspect of employer liability is in the area of "reverse"
harassment. This situation arises when a qualified employee loses a promo-
tion or other competitive employment opportunity to a co-employee who has
provided sexual favors in return for receiving the benefit. The losing em-
ployee has not been harassed in the usual sense of the word, but has suffered
employment consequences because of sexually based favoritism on the part of
the decision maker. The EEOC Guidelines provide for employer liability to
the losing employee in this situation if the request is made by the employer;
there is no discussion of liability if the request is made by a supervisor who is
successful and makes an employment decision based on his success.88 Also,
the Guidelines do not state whether the employer's successful request must be
unwelcome for the losing employee to recover, nor whether the losing em-
87. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1980). This situation obviously is not traditional, overt
harassment, but it may impact on the work environment so as to meet the definition of harassment
in § 1604.1 l(a), supra. This application also distinctly raises the issue of whether the harassment
requires intent by the harasser, i.e., whether the wearing of revealing clothing must be done with
the intent of committing an unwelcome physical act of a sexual nature.
What if the employee is in a workplace where he is forced to view nonemployees in offensive
or sexually suggestive clothing? This is part of the larger question of the scope of employer liabil-
ity for harassment by nonemployees. The Guidelines state that the employer may be liable for
such harassment in the workplace where the employer knows or should have known of the con-
duct and fails to take immediate appropriate action; however, employer liability is conditioned on
the extent of the employer's control and other legal responsibilities with respect to the conduct of
such nonemployees. § 1604.11(e). This section again uses the vague standard of actual or con-
structive knowledge. Also, this issue of employer control over the nonemployee is a factual issue
that will require some fine factual delineations. For example, if an independent contractor ha-
rasses an employee at the workplace, does the employer have the requisite control over the har-
asser to be held liable for harassment of any employee?
There are several cases that have held the employer liable for nonemployee harassment
where the employer had little if any control over the nonemployee harasser. See, e.g., [1973]
EEOC Dec. 4502 (1971) (Negro employee of a beauty shop was constructively discharged when
she resigned because of racial harassment by customers); EEOC & Hasselman v. Sage Realty
Corp., 78 Civ. 4607 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (employer forced employee receptionists in a large building
lobby to wear revealing outfits; the employer was held liable for sexual harassment of these recep-
tionists by persons walking through the lobby.
88. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1980).
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ployee can recover if the employee getting the benefit suggested the sexual
favor to the employer.
One further undefined issue is what constitutes timely and appropriate
action by an employer sufficient to rebut liability once he has notice of the
employee harassment. Some guidance in this area can be derived from the
Continental Can decision and Title VII cases. "Timely" was interpreted in
Continental Can to mean immediately, as soon as the employer knows or
should know of the harassment.8 9 Thus, an employer can take appropriate
action but still be liable if he knew or should have known of the conduct so as
to have acted sooner.90 Several Title VII cases have also construed "timely" to
mean immediately.91
"Appropriate action" is more difficult to determine because it depends on
the differing facts of the harassment in each case. In Continental Can the em-
ployer did not know the identity of the harassing employees and thus took no
action. In finding that Continental's failure to take action violated the Human
Rights Act,92 the court pointed to Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co.93 as an example
of appropriate action. There the employer, faced with unidentified harassers,
disseminated its written antiharassment policy to all employees and took steps
to placate the aggrieved employee.94 Furthermore, when Continental learned
the identity of the harassers in the second incident, the court indicated that
appropriate action required an immediate investigation and an attempt to pre-
vent further occurrences. 95 This could be accomplished by disciplining the
offenders, informing everyone of the employer's disapproval, and transferring
the victim or harasser to a different position. An employer cannot shrug off an
allegation of harassment, but must investigate all allegations.
96
89. - Minn. at--, 297 N.W.2d at 250 (1980). Although the decision doesn't define "immedi-
ately" it appears to mean as soon as possible after receiving notice.
90. This constituted Continental's second violation of the Human Rights Act. Id. See note
26 and accompanying text supra.
91. See, E.g., Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., 425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Howard v.
National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corporation,
353 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
92. - Minn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 250 (1980).
93. 425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
94. Id. at 1128-36.
95. - Minn. at -, 297 N.W.2d at 250 (1980).
96. Since employers can reduce the extent of their liability by reducing sexual harassment,
employers should seek to take preventive actions. The Guidelines take the position that preven-
tion is the best method of elimination, and state that employers should take all steps necessary to
prevent harassment. To accomplish this, the employer should develop a strong policy against
harassment that expresses the employer's personal disapproval. This policy should be distributed
in written form to all employees, and all employees must be made aware of it. Employees must be
aware of the potential sanctions, and these sanctions must be sufficient to discourage harassment.
The employer should inform the employees of their right to bring a harassment action and
how to go about doing so. A viable grievance procedure that allows the employer to acquire
immediate notice is important in cases of employee harassment. If a victim is stymied in her
attempts to give notice or file a complaint, the employer may be held to the "should have known"
standard. Finally, the employer should have a means of reviewing all employment decisions
made by its supervisors to detect possible harassment.
Unfortunately for the employer, preventive measures are no shield against liability. It is
hoped that the measures will reduce harassment, but they cannot reduce liability if harassment
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Despite the unanswered issues raised by Continental Can, it is a valuable
decision because it provides an injured employee a viable form of redress.
This decision and the new EEOC Guidelines greatly expand an employer's
liability for acts of all its employees, and self interest should prompt employers
to take all possible steps to prevent harassment. If harassment does occur, the
employer will be motivated to remedy the situation rather than to take a re-
signed attitude. The court's decision and the new Guidelines also have the
effect of making the cause of action for sexual harassment consistent with
other Title VII harassment actions. 97 These developments are a victory for
sexual equality in the workplace since female employees now have a remedy
for harassment that provides them a reasonable chance of success in the work-
place.
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occurs. If an employee does not get the message, the employer will be liable if he fails to take
timely, appropriate action after notice; if a supervisor does not heed the warnings, the employer
bears the brunt of the responsibility.
97. The Guidelines note this attempt for consistency under Title VII by stating: "The princi-
les involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin." 29 C.F.R.
1604.11, note 1 (1980).
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